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Under § 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor's plan of
reorganization cannot be confirmed unless at least one "impaired class" accepts
the plan, excluding acceptance of any insider of the debtor.1 A class of claims
accepts the plan if more than one-half in number and at least two-thirds in
amount of claims voting in a class favor the plan.' Thus, a debtor's composition
of its classes clearly has a substantial impact upon its chances of successfully
confirming its plan of reorganization over dissenting creditors. Obviously, the
debtor would like to have unfettered power and full discretion to group creditors
in a way that increases the likelihood that the majority in each class will vote on
the plan it proposes.' This means that the debtor will do whatever is possible to
isolate unfriendly and dissenting creditors. In some cases, this classification

Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary' s Law School.
1. 11U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
2. § 1126(c).
3. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds.,
2017) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY] (illustrating agreements by which the debtor can
increase support for the proposed plan).
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treatment is criticized as impermissible gerrymandering in contravention of §
1122 of the Bankruptcy Code. 4
Section 1122(a) expressly provides that only substantially similar claims may
be placed in the same class.5 It does not, however, expressly require that all
substantially similar claims be placed in the same class, nor does it expressly
prohibit substantially similar claims from being classified separately. 6 Several
courts, nonetheless, hold that "Section 1122 [] must contemplate some limits on
classification of claims of similar [rights]." ' 7 Other courts disagree. 8 This creates
confusion and unpredictability and courts are yet to agree on a uniform approach
to deal with this classification issue.
The additional requirement of § 1129(a)(10) that the accepting class be
"impaired" creates further tension amongst courts, scholars and practitioners. 9
Section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code states that a creditor's claim is "impaired"
unless its rights are left "unaltered" by the plan. 10 Several cases hold that an
alteration intended only to create an impaired class to vote for a plan so that a
debtor can confirm it over other dissenting classes is not allowed.11 These cases
note that such manipulation - referred to as "artificial impairment" - is contrary
to the purpose of § 1129(a)(10), which, these cases suggest, is designed to
provide some indicia of support for a plan by truly harmed creditors - i.e., those
with a real financial stake in the outcome of the debtor's case. 12 Other cases,
however, hold that the broad language in § 1124 allows any legal, equitable, or
contractual alteration of rights to constitute impairment, including the slightest
impairment of de minimis claims, and that abuses on the part of a plan proponent
ought not affect the application of Congress's definition of impairment. 13
Although an issue in all Chapter 11 cases, the battle over improper
classification and artificial impairment is widely prevalent in Single Asset Real
Estate (SARE) cases, where a primary obstacle to confirmation is finding a "plan

4. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 821 (1992) (stating "thou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to
gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan").
5. § 1122(a).
6. See In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, Nos. 99 12287 JMD, CM 99 747, 1999 WL 33457789,
at *4 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 1999) (finding that the majority of circuits "hold that separate classification
of legally similar claims is not prohibited").
7. Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at 1278 79, see e.g. In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R.
202, 216 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
8. CGE Shattuck, 1999 WL 33457789, at *4.
9. See In re Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 243-44 (3rd Cir. 2004); In re Vill. at
Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d 239,245-46 (5th Cir. 2013); In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d
940, 943 (9th Cir. 1993); In re All Land Inv., LLC, 468 B.R. 676, 689 90 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012).
11. In re Windsor on the River Assocs., 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993); see also infra note
176 and accompanying text.
12. See Windsor on the River Assocs., 7 F.3d at 131.
13. L & JAnaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 943.
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[that] is accepted by at least one [creditor] class of impaired claims." 14 Under
the Bankruptcy Code, real property is "single asset real estate" only if it is a
single property or project from which the debtor derives substantially all of the
debtor's gross income.15 This narrow definition means only a few classes of
creditors generally exist in a typical SARE case: (1) a secured claim against the
real property held by the mortgagee; (2) a rather large unsecured deficiency
claim also held by the mortgagee since the real property is usually underwater;
and (3) a few general unsecured claims held by trade creditors.16 In most cases,
the mortgagee is unsupportive of the debtor's plan to reorganize and its sole
purpose is to foreclose on the real property securing the loan. As such, it is
critical for the SARE debtor to classify the hostile mortgagee's unsecured
deficiency claim separately from the other unsecured claims, since the sheer size
of a typical deficiency claim would generally allow the deficiency claimant to
block confirmation by controlling the vote of a single unsecured creditor class.
Without this separation, there would be no impaired accepting class and the
SARE debtor could not confirm its plan - i.e., it would eventually lose its
property (and its business) through a foreclosure. In addition to this common
classification maneuvering in order to isolate the deficiency claim, the SARE
debtor may attempt to minimally alter - that is, "artificially impair" - the
friendly, isolated class of trade creditors to secure the needed vote necessary to
17
comply with § 1129(a)(10).
Courts, practitioners, and scholars are continuously at odds over the meaning
of the code provisions that govern the concepts of classification and impairment.
The current approaches for dealing with these sections, particularly in SARE
cases, yield confusion and actually make the reorganization process needlessly
complex, costly, and unpredictable. Even more problematic is that the muddle
surrounding these code provisions results in decisions which are contrary to the
congressional intent behind the Chapter 11 reorganization process.18 But courts
do not need to construe these code sections in order to make a determination of
the improper classification and artificial impairment issues. Rather, this Article
contends that improper classification and artificial impairment should go to a
debtor's good faith in proposing a plan under § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy
Code - i.e., improper classification and artificial impairment should be nothing
more than components of the good-faith analysis required by § 1129(a)(3).

14. See infra note 93.
15. § 101(51B).
16. See H. Miles Cohn, Single Asset Chapter]] Cases, 26 TULSA L.J. 523, 527 28 (1991).
17. See In re RYYZ, LLC., 490 B.R. 29, 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing how the
debtor can affect the de minimis impairment of claims and variety of opinions courts continue to
hold).
18. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing how
the Windsor court had imposed requirements contrary to congressional intent).
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Section 1129(a)(3) requires the debtor's plan to be "proposed in good faith. '"19
Where the plan is proposed with a legitimate and honest purpose to reorganize
- a subjective standard - and has a reasonable chance of success - an objective
standard - the good faith standard is generally satisfied.20 In this Article, the
author suggests that in SARE cases, a presumption should exist that separate
classification of deficiency claims from other unsecured claims or impairment
of de minimis claims for the purpose of achieving confirmation over the
objection of a creditor is per se bad faith.
Under this proposed framework, the SARE debtor must overcome the
presumption of bad faith in its proposed plan of reorganization and justify any
separate classification of the deficiency claim or demonstrate that the deficiency
claim is dissimilar from other unsecured claims, rather than waiting for the
deficiency claimant to object or attack the classification scheme.2 1 If the debtor
successfully rebuts the presumption by showing that the deficiency claim was
not separately classified to gerrymander a consenting class of impaired claims
or that the deficiency claim is, in fact, legally unalike other unsecured claims,
the burden shifts to the creditor to demonstrate abuse.22 Likewise, when
improper impairment is the issue, the debtor must address § 1129(a)(3) directly
in its proposed plan and overcome a presumption that the impairment of the de
minimis claim was deliberate and for the sole purpose of achieving a forced
confirmation over the objection of creditors.2 Similar to the classification issue,
this presumption can be overcome with evidence showing economic justification
for such impairment.24 This framework, the author contends, does not operate
decisively to block reorganization in SARE cases. Instead, it creates a new
hurdle for SARE debtors and operates to curtail abuses of the bankruptcy process
that are prevalent in SARE cases.
I. REORGANIZING BUSINESSES

A. The Basics and Benefits of Chapter]] Reorganization
To understand the classification and impairment issue, one must grasp the
basics of Chapter 11 reorganization. Elizabeth Warren notes that: "Businesses
fail. Sometimes they collapse in a loud crash. Sometimes they drift downward,
like a balloon with a slow leak. But fast or slow, noisy or quiet, businesses that

19. § 1129(a)(3).
20. See In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[D]efining the good faith standard
in the bankruptcy context as 'requiring a showing that the plan was proposed 'honesty and good
intentions' and with 'a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected. "') (quoting Manati
Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir. 1935)).
21. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
22. Id.
23. See Vill.
at Camp Bowie, 710 F.3d at 247-48 (analyzing the differences between good
faith and bad faith presumptions).
24. See infra note 79.
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were once fueled by optimism may someday face their demise."25 Yet,
liquidating and selling off a failed business's assets piecemeal is not always the
answer.
Salvageable businesses should be rescued or, in some cases,
resuscitated. Chapter 11 provides the answer. As the drafters of Chapter 11 put
it:
The purpose of a reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return
for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that
assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.
Often, the return on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to
compensate those who have invested in the business. Cash flow
problems may develop and require creditors of the business, both trade
creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of their claims.
If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned
to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than
26
to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
The beauty of Chapter 11 is that it allows dying businesses to do things that
might otherwise be difficult or impossible to achieve outside of Chapter 11. For
example, unlike Chapter 7 liquidation, the business debtor in Chapter 11 will
continue to operate the business and manage its assets as the "debtor in

25. ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING BUSINESSES 1 (2008).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977). Judge Goldberg of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit described the Chapter 11 process in comical and somewhat mystical terms in
In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 698 F.2d 775, 779 80 (5th Cir. 1983):
Bankruptcy serves a role in corporate life eerily similar to that of the doctrine of
reincarnation in some eastern religions. Bankruptcy is the belief that the souls of a
corporate entity, the equity-holders, do not just vanish when their corporeal form dies.
Rather, they learn from the mistakes of a previous incarnation and can once again live on
the earth in corporate form. True, they may suffer for the sins of previous incarnations
and have trouble raising venture capital, but such is the karmic burden. With luck,
someday a corporation may achieve enlightenment and reach a plane of eternal bliss and
nirvana the Fortune 500.
Though the relatives of a departed soul may receive intellectual comfort at the thought
of reincarnation, they are often more touched by the pain and immediacy of their personal
loss. Just as it is in life, so it is in bankruptcy. The close cousins of the equity-holders,
the debt-holders, take little spiritual comfort from the knowledge that the equity-holders
may someday be reincorporated. Instead, they are more aware of the anguish of their
personal loss, the money they loaned the deceased corporation.
It is at this point that the black robed judge steps in as the saffron robed monk and
comforter. Perhaps the corporation has left behind some small amount of worldly goods,
some trinkets to remind the debt-holders of their friendship with the departed. Ah, but
how to divide the estate so that everyone can have some little item of memorabilia?
This is a question of great spiritual and temporal import. Fortunately, the sacred writings
[of the Bankruptcy Code] can provide guidance and inspiration.
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possession."2 The operation of the debtor's business may require the use, sale,
or lease of property of the debtor's estate. 28 "[A]nd, unless the court orders
otherwise, the [debtor in possession] may enter into transactions, including the
sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without
29
notice [to creditors] or a hearing" before the bankruptcy judge.
Additionally, the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays - i.e.,
retrains, prohibits, precludes - any creditor-lender activity or repossessing or
foreclosing on the debtor's property.30 Obtaining the protections of the
automatic stay is often the primary reason for filing a bankruptcy petition,
particularly for a business that is trying to survive.3 1 Congress, in enacting the
Bankruptcy Code, was quite clear as to the purpose of the stay:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and
all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment
or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
32
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
The stay is also fundamental to other policies underlying the Bankruptcy
Code: equal distribution to creditors of equal priority and orderly administration
of the estate.33 The automatic stay is particularly significant in Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases because it gives the debtor the chance to formulate a plan to
present to its creditors for acceptance and approval.
Chapter 11 also enables the debtor to borrow new funds during the bankruptcy
case.3 4 The bankruptcy code "provides certain incentives that a debtor [in
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012).
28. § 363.
29. § 363(c)(1).
30. § 362(a). The automatic stay is so named because it becomes effective automatically upon
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Ellis v. Consol.Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 371 (10th Cir.
1990). The debtor does not have to do anything to make it effective. ld. The creditor has the burden
of moving to get the stay lifted. ld. It is no excuse that the creditor did not have notice of the filing
before the action was taken. Id. The action will still be set aside as void. See e.g., id. (holding
summary judgment void where entered prior to lifting automatic stay).
31. See e.g., id.(noting filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers to protections of an automatic
stay).
32. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977).
33. See e.g., In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 798 99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) ("The stay insures that
the debtor's affairs will be centralized, initially, in a single forum in order to prevent conflicting
judgments from different courts and in order to harmonize all of the creditors' interests with one
another.").
34. § 364; see H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (stating that § 364 "governs all obtaining of credit and
incurring of debt by the estate"); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, 364.01, at 1
("Section 364 now governs all obtaining of credit and incurring of debt by the estate, whether by
the trustee... or by the debtor in possession...."); 2 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §

39:19 (2011) ("[P]ostpetition financial arrangements are subject to the provisions of Code § 364
concerning obtaining credit.").
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possession] may offer, with court approval, to induce a potential lender" to
undertake the risks involved in providing post-petition financing to a bankruptcy
estate. "These incentives include granting the lender [when necessary under
statutorily defined circumstances] an administrative expense priority under §
364(b), a 'super-priority' claim under § 364(c)(1), or a lien on unencumbered
estate assets under § 364(c)(2) or (3), on account of the post-petition credit
extended.1 36 Further, the Bankruptcy Code provides that, under appropriate
circumstances and after notice and a hearing, the court may authorize the
obtaining of credit secured by a lien on encumbered property that is senior or
37
equal to any existing lien on the property- often referred to as a "priming lien."1
Again, the concept of obtaining credit with its associated incentives is unique to
the bankruptcy process.
In addition, Chapter 11 gives the debtor-in-possession the right to assume
beneficial "executory contracts" and to reject those that might be burdensome,
"subject to court approval.1 38 Contracts that are executory - i.e., contracts with
material obligations owing on either side - could be one of the main reasons a
debtor's business is suffering. 39 Take, for example, an energy company that has
entered into a coal supply contract. The contract provides that the energy
company will purchase coal from the coal provider for the next 10 years at
$50/ton. The energy company entered into the coal supply contract when coal
was at $60/ton, so it was considered a good bargain. Assume, however, that
within two years of the contract, coal drops to $30/ton. Energy company is
obligated to keep purchasing coal at what is now an inflated price. This could
be detrimental to its business. Bankruptcy would give energy company, now the
debtor-in-possession, the power to reject this contract. On the other hand, if coal
were now selling for $75/ton, energy company would want this contract to
remain intact, despite the fact that it might be in breach for failure to pay.
Chapter 11 would give the energy company power to assume the contract,
despite the fact that it had breached.
The "subject to court approval" language was added to the code to "insure that
the [debtor-in-possession's assumption of the contract] gives the other
contracting party the full benefit of his bargain."4'
"The bankruptcy court
reviews the debtor's "business judgment" with respect to the proposed
assumption or rejection to determine if it would be beneficial or burdensome to
assume or reject the executory contract by evaluating whether assumption or
rejection would serve the reorganization or whether it would harm other
35.
36.
37.

In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 945 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1092 93.
§ 364(d).

38.

§ 365(a).

39. See e.g., Sun Runner Marine, 945 F.2d at 1091 92 (finding the business was beginning
to fail because of an executory contract).
40. In re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co., 78 F.3d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting S. REP. No.
98-989, at 59 (1978)).
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creditors."41 Where a debtor has defaulted on a contract and the debtor-inpossession wants to assume the contract, the bankruptcy code also requires that
a debtor-in-possession at the time of assumption (1) "cure[] or provide[]
adequate assurance [of] prompt[] cure" of that default; (2) "compensate[] or
provide adequate assurance [of] prompt[] compensate[ion]"; and (3) "provide[]
adequate assurance of future performance under [the] contract."42 In the Chapter
11 context, the debtor's plan of reorganization must provide means for "curing
or waiving any [outstanding] default[s] .,4 At the plan confirmation stage, the
bankruptcy court approves those means. At confirmation, the bankruptcy court
also approves the plan "provisions for the assumption, rejection, or assignment
of any executory contract[s]."'
Finally, Chapter 11 enables a debtor to develop a debt-restructuring
plan that
45
will bind all creditors, even those who do not accept it.
B. The Concept of a "Plan"
Every debtor that commences a voluntary case under Chapter 11 is presumed
to intend to bring about consensual acceptance and court approval of what is
called a "plan of reorganization. '46 The word "plan" appears in several places
in the Bankruptcy Code. 41 Section 1103(c)(3), for example, states that one of
the important duties of a creditor's committee is to "participate in the
formulation of a plan."'48 Section 1106(a)(5), moreover, mandates the debtor in
possession, as soon as practicable after the commencement of the case, to file "a
plan. ' 4 9 And § 11 12(b)(4)(J)-(M) authorize dismissal or conversion of a Chapter
50
11 case for failure to propose, confirm, or carry out the provisions of "a plan."
The confirmation of a plan is the prime objective of the Chapter 11 case
evidenced by the judge's wide discretion to dismiss a case if there is an "inability
to effectuate a plan. '51 Nonetheless, the idea of "a plan" and "confirmation" of
the plan can be a nebulous concept for those unfamiliar with bankruptcy law.
Simply put, "[a] plan of reorganization is a contract which binds a debtor and
its creditors." 52 The plan tells the creditors what they will receive on account of
their claims and when and how they will receive it. As the Second Circuit
observed, "[t]he plan of reorganization determines how much and in what form
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993).
§ 365(b)(1)(A) (C).
§ 1123(a)(5)(G).
§ 1123(b)(2).
§ 1123(b).
§ 1123(a).
See generally § 1106 (using the word "plan" repeatedly).
§ 1103(c)(3).
§ 1106(a)(5).
§ 1112(b)(4)(J) (M).
§ 1112.
In re Pettibone Corp., 134 B.R. 349, 351 52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
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creditors will be paid, whether stockholders will continue to retain any interests,
and in what form the business will continue." 53 Generally, a plan must be
54
accepted by creditors and confirmed by the court in order to become effective.
The court held In re Herronthat "[o]nce a plan is confirmed, the preconfirmation
debt is 'replaced' with a new indebtedness as provided in the confirmed plan.
The new indebtedness is in essence a new and binding contract between the
debtor and the creditors." 55 Furthermore, a confirmed plan "discharges" a debtor
that continues in business from any pre -confirmation debt. 56 Consider the
following example as illustrative:
Assume that a plan provides that holders of unsecured claims will
receive 20 cents on the dollar in six monthly installments in
satisfaction of their claims. An unsecured creditor with an allowed
claim of $10,000, therefore, would only be entitled to $2,000 under
the plan, spread out over six months (i.e., $333.33/month). The
debtor's remaining liability - the $8,000 deficiency - to the creditor is
discharged pursuant to Section 1141(d)(1). Also assume the newly
reorganized debtor paid the first installment, but defaulted on the
second. Could the newly reorganized debtor file suit to recover on the
original $10,000 claim? The answer is: no. The creditor would be
relegated to the $2,000 reorganized debt and could bring an action
only to recover the balance owing on the new $2,000 debt. Thus,
unlike the common law theories of contract dealing with accord and
satisfaction, whereby a creditor agrees to accept in full satisfaction
something less than the amounts of the original claim only when
performance is rendered, a confirmed plan permanently modifies the
5
debtor's obligations, notwithstanding a subsequent default.
Confirmation of the plan is clearly the goal of every debtor in possession. The
requirements for confirmation of a proposed Chapter 11 plan are listed in 11
U.S.C. § 1129.58 The proponent of the plan bears the burden of establishing the
plan's compliance with each of these requirements, including the first
requirement found in § 1129(a)(1), which states that "[t]he plan complies with
the applicable provisions of this title." 59 The phrase "applicable provisions" is
not defined. The legislative history of § 1129(a)(1), however, explains that this
provision incorporates the requirements of § 1122 and § 1123, which govern

53. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983).
54. See § 1129(a).
55. In re Herron, 60 B.R. 82, 84 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); see also In re Ernst, 45 B.R. 700,
702 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ("The plan is essentially a new and binding contract, sanctioned by the
Court, between the debtor and his preconfirmation creditors.").
56. § 1141(d)(1)(a).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. § 1129(a)(1).
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classification of claims and interests
60
reorganization.

and the contents of a plan of

C. Classificationof Claims
Section 1123(a)(1) and (a)(4) mandate, in pertinent part, that "a plan shall designate, subject to [§1 1122 of this title, classes of claims," and shall "provide
the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the
'61
holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment.
The importance of classification of claims is not explicitly set out in the
Bankruptcy Code, but the purpose is simple: creditors vote for a proposed plan
of reorganization by class - not in their individual capacity - and the debtor only
needs one class to accept its plan as a condition to confirmation. Classification
of claims, therefore, plays a central role in the formation and confirmation of the
62
Chapter 11 plan.
Section 1126(c) states that a class is deemed to have accepted a plan if
creditors constituting more than one-half of the members of the class and
representing at least two-thirds of the amount of debt owed to that class have
voted in favor of the plan.63 Because of the importance of voting by classes, the
64
debtor and its creditors often fight about the composition of the classes.
Obviously, the debtor would like to have unfettered power and full discretion to
group creditors in a way that increases the likelihood that the majority in each
class will vote on the plan it proposes. 6 This means that the debtor will do
whatever is possible to isolate unfriendly and dissenting creditors. These
creditors, not surprisingly, object to this classification treatment, often referring
66
to the debtor's actions as improper gerrymandering.
6
Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code governs classification of claims. 7
Section 1122(a) requires that a plan "place a claim or an interest in a particular
class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or
interests of such class." 6 "Substantially similar" generally means similar in

60. H.R. REP.No. 95-595, at 412 (1977); S. REP.No. 95-989, at 126 (1978); see Kane v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Toy & Sports Warehouse, Inc.,
37 B.R. 141, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
61. § 1123(a)(1), (4).
62. See § 1123(a)(1) (4).
63. § 1126(c).
64. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, 1100.01 (discussing the motivations for
creditor classifications).
65. Id.
66. See e.g., In re Boston Post Road Ltd. P'ship, 21 F.3d477,479 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1109 (1995); In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 821 (1992).
67. § 1122.
68. § 1122(a).
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legal nature, character, or effect.69 Thus, when a debtor seeks to confirm a plan
of reorganization, it must submit to the court that the plan's classification of
7
claims and interest is appropriate under Section 1122. 1
Section 1122(a) speaks only to the types of claims that can be classified
together, but it does not address the question of whether substantially similar
claims may be classified separately. 71 Nonetheless, § 1122(a) mandates that
dissimilar claims cannot be placed into the same class. Thus, "[t]he threshold
question for [a] bankruptcy court when applying [§1 1122(a) is to determine
whether the claims are 'substantially similar.' 2 The Bankruptcy Code,
however, is silent on how to ascertain whether claims are "substantially similar."
Accordingly, the meaning of "substantially similar" is left to the courts. Courts,
however, vary in this meaning and there is a "paucity of case law defining what
constitutes either similarity or substantial similarity of claims." '7' The Ninth
Circuit, for example, has determined that "bankruptcy court judges must
evaluate the nature of each claim, i.e., the kind, species, or character of each
category of claims."'74 The Fifth Circuit holds that 'substantially similar claims'
75
[are] those which share common priority and rights against the debtor's estate."
The First Circuit announced a general principle that "all creditors of equal rank
76
with claims against the same property should be placed in the same class."
And the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated:
This [§ 1122] codifies current case law surrounding classification of
claim and equity securities. It requires classification based on the
nature of the claims or interests classified, and permits inclusion of
claims or interests in a particular class only if the claim or interest
being included is substantially similar to the other claims or interests
77
of the class.
Despite the lack of a generally accepted definition of the phrase "substantially
similar," § 1122(a) clearly mandates that dissimilar claims may not be placed
into the same class.7v Thus, if the bankruptcy court determines that the claims
are not substantially similar, the analysis should end there - the claims must be
69. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, 1122.03[3]; see also In re Johnston, 21 F.3d
323, 327 (9th Cir. 1994).
70. § 1123.
71. In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 1986).
72. In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525, 536 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
73. In re Loop 76, LLC, 442 B.R. 713,716 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010).
74. Johnston, 21 F.3d at 327.
75. In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., 632 F.3d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 2011).
76. Granada Wines, Inc. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 748 F.2d
42, 46 (1st Cir. 1984).
77. S.REP. No. 95-989, at 118 (1978); see also CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE: A
GUDE TO REORGANIZATION § 30.16 (James F. Queenan, Jr. et al eds., 1994) (stating that " [t]hese
committee reports, like the statute itself, expressly encompass only the requirement of homogeneity
of claims placed within the same class.").
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012).
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separately classified. If, however, the court finds that the claims are
substantially similar and the debtor seeks to classify them separately, a few
approaches have emerged to determine whether this separate classification is
appropriate.
A majority of courts say that the plan may place these substantially similar
claims in different classes if the debtor can show a business or economic
justification for doing so. 9 But absent a business or economic justification, it is
not enough to justify separate classification of substantially similar claims.
Indeed, when objections to classification under § 1122(a) arise, courts are
oftentimes presented with allegations that the plan proponent separately
classified similar claims only to ensure acceptance by at least one class of
impaired claims required by § 1129(a)(10), as discussed below.80
Such
manipulation is viewed as an abuse of Chapter 11. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has
held that "one clear rule [has] emerge[d] from [the] otherwise muddled case law
on § 1122 claims: [T]hou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to
gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan."81 Thus, when the
debtor separately classifies legally similar claims, but can demonstrate "business
or economic reasons independent of the debtor's need to secure the acceptance
of a plan by an impaired accepting class of creditors for purposes of
82
confirmation," the majority approach would allow it.
The other approach does not consider a business or economic justification for
placing substantially similar claims in separate classes. This approach -referred
to as the so-called "strict approach" derived from pre-Code Chapter X cases requires all creditors of equal rank with claims against the same property to be
placed in the same class, regardless of business or economic issues.83 Thus,
"[s]eparate classification for unsecured creditors, [for example, is] only justified
where the legal character of their claims is such as to accord them a status
different from the other unsecured creditors." 84
79. See Barakt v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Barakat), 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir. 1996).
"Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that
a debtor proposing a cramdown plan must show a reason for separately classifying unsecured
claims other than the need to secure the vote of an impaired class of claims." In re CGE Shattuck,
LLC., Nos. 99 12287 JMD, CM 99 747, 1999 WL 33457789, at *4 (D.N.H. 1999) (citing In re
Boston Post Road Ltd. P'ship, 21 F.3d 477, 481 83 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109
(1995)); see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. ParkAssocs., 987 F.2d 154,159 (3rd
Cir. 1993); In re Bryson Props.XVIIL, 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 866
(1992); In re Lumber Exchange Bldg. Ltd. P 'ship, 968 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1992); In re
Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 80 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 821
(1992)); In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997).
80. Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at 1278, 1280.
81. Phoenix Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir.
1991).
82. CGE Shattuck, 1999 WL 33457789, at *4.
83. See In re Barney & Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
84. ILd.
(emphasis added) (quoting Granada Wines, Inc. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking
Indus. Pension Fund, 748 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1984)).
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Clearly, these two approaches are at odds with each other. Debtors who file
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions in circuits that have adopted the flexible
business/economic justification approach have a much easier path to
confirmation. Debtors who file in circuits adopting the strict approach, on the
other hand, will be required to demonstrate that each class of claims in its plan
is materially different5- i.e., that the legal character or nature of the claims are
8
simply not the same.
In addition to properly organizing its claims into classes, part of plan
confirmation requires the debtor to "specify any class of claims or interests that
is not impaired.... [and] specify the treatment of any class of claims or interests
that is impaired under the plan."86 Understanding the meaning and import of
"impairment" is crucial to the development of a confirmable plan of
reorganization.
D. The Accepting Impaired Class
There are two ways in which a plan of reorganization may be confirmed. One
way is that the plan may be agreed to by the affirmative vote of all impaired
classes - i.e., a consensual plan.8 7 "This consensual means of plan negotiation
and confirmation is among the paramount goals of Chapter 11 "" However,
[S]hould an impaired class vote against confirmation, all hope is not
lost, for a plan can be confirmed [- that is, "crammed down" -] over
the vote of dissenting classes of claims under the cramdown provisions
of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) if all the requirements of subsection (a) of
section 1129 are satisfied, excluding (a)(8) [(which requires all
impaired classes to accept the plan),] and the bankruptcy court is
satisfied that the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and
equitable with respect to each class of impaired claims that has not
accepted the plan [- i.e., a nonconsensual plan.]8 9
"But the requirement of approval by at least one impaired accepting class (not
counting the votes of insiders) must be met." 9 Thus, the concept of class
"impairment" is paramount to confirmation - a debtor always needs an accepting
91
impaired class.
92
Section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code defines "impairment" in the negative.
Under § 1124, "a class of claims or interests is 'impaired' under a plan of
reorganization, unless, with respect to each claim or interest [in the] class, the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id.
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
§ 1129(a)(8).
In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
§ 1124.
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plan leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such
claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest," or cures a default
and leaves such legal, equitable, and contractual rights otherwise unaltered."
Thus, by negative implication from the statute's language, any alteration of the
pre-petition legal or equitable rights of a creditor, positive or negative, is an
impairment.94
"The concept of 'impairment' was engrafted into § 1129(a)(10) in 1984 in an
attempt to engender in the reorganization process a greater degree of consensus
by mandating the affirmative vote by a class of claimants whose rights were
altered under a plan of reorganization."9 5 This mandatory requirement for plan
confirmation where at least one accepting class is impaired - that is, that will not
receive the full value of its claims - has created much controversy.
Section 1129(a)(10) provides that "[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the
96
plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider."
This section, therefore, is designed to prevent a plan from being confirmed
unless a class of creditors impaired by such plan support it.9 The Eighth Circuit
has stated that "[t]he purpose of [Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10)] 'is to provide
some indicia of support [for a plan] by affected creditors and prevent
confirmation where such support is lacking."' 98 "As such, [§] 1129(a)(10)
requires that a plan of reorganization pass muster in the opinion of creditors
whose rights to repayment from the debtor are implicated by the
reorganization. " 99 Indeed, "[b]y providing impaired creditors the right to vote
on confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code ensures the terms of the reorganization
are monitored by those who have a financial stake in its outcome.""10
The author believes that two basic principles underlie § 1129(a)(10): fairness
and judicial efficiency. The fairness component focuses on what is fair to the
creditors. Indeed, "before embarking upon the tortuous path of cram down and
compelling the target of cram down to shoulder the risks of error necessarily
associated with a forced confirmation, there must be some other properly

93. Id.
94. See In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 47 B.R. 932, 940 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd, 800
F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "a creditor is unimpaired only if the plan restores the
creditor to its pre-petition position"); see also In re Elecs. & Metals Industs., Inc., 153 B.R. 36, 38
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992); see also In re Valley Park Group, Inc., 96 B.R. 16, 22 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1989).
95. John R. Clemancy & Nancy J. March, Artificial Impairment and the Elusive Accepting
Impaired Class in Single Asset Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 21 (1993).
96. § 1129(a)(10).
97. Id.
98. In re Windsor on the River Assoc., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 131 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting In re
Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989)).
99. In re Combustion Eng'g., Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 244 (3rd Cir. 2004).
100. Id.
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classified group that is also hurt and nonetheless favors the plan.""1 1 Indeed, §
1129(a)(10) clearly ensures "there must be someone other than the debtor, other
than the insiders, and other than the target of the cram down, who cares enough
about the reorganization and whose rights must also be considered to invoke the
equitable grounds that justify resort to cram down."1 2 If fairness were not a
consideration, § 1129(a)(10) would not expressly exclude the votes of insiders.
Section 1129(a)(10) mandates that the votes of insiders be omitted from
calculating plan acceptances, even if the result is an unconfirmable plan.10 3
While the impact of this requirement may appear harsh,
"[t]he exclusion recognizes that where a creditor is under the debtor's
proverbial thumb due to the parties' affinity of interests, that creditor
is less likely, perhaps even incapable, of casting a vote formed on an
independent judgment of what will best
serve his interests, much less
10 4
those of his fellow class members.1
Section 1129(a)(10) also preserves judicial resources: if the debtor fails to
attain the requisite acceptance from an impaired, non-insider class, then the court
need consider the plan no further.10 5 Indeed, "[i]f cramdown is not available, it
is pointless to further consider a plan which requires cramdown for its
success." 10 6 Courts across the board recognize that "a threshold and potentially
dispositive issue is the.., hurdle present in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) .... 107
Because § 1129(a)(10) essentially functions as a gatekeeper to confirmation
by excluding unfair plans with no creditor support, its application is not without
controversy.
The seemingly straightforward construction of § 1129(a)(10) belies
the obstacle it can present in the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization. Indeed, the generality of § 1129(a)(10) has caused
bankruptcy courts and federal circuits alike to come to diametrically
opposed conclusions about the ability of § 1129(a)(10) to scuttle plan
confirmation. 108
The § 1129(a)(10) battle is even more prevalent in SARE Cases, where a
primary obstacle to confirmation is simply finding a creditor that favors the plan.

101. In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
102. In re Anderson Oaks (Phase I) Ltd. P'ship., 77 B.R. 108, 112 13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1987).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
104. In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 210 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
105. § 1129(a)(10).
106. Anderson Oaks, 77 B.R. at 113.
107. In re Duval Manor Assoc., 191 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
108. Carson T. H. Emmons, Construction and Application of 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(10),
Requiring at Least One ImpairedClass to Accept Planfor Confirmation, 4 A.L.R. FED. 3D ART. 3
(2015).
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II. THE SARE DEBTOR AND THE HURDLES
A. The SARE Debtor
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, there was no express
mention of single asset real estate. 10 9 As such, there was no specific limitation
on the relief afforded a debtor with a case entirely dependent on one piece of
real estate. Congress, however, found a need to curb abusive filings and protect
secured creditors who were being strung out for long periods of time, having no
remuneration and no real hope of reorganization by the debtor.110 Accordingly,
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 added provisions to create special treatment
'
for debtors with assets constituting "single asset real estate."111
The Bankruptcy
Code defines "single asset real estate" as:
[R]eal property constituting a single property or project, other than
residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which
generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not
a family farmer and on which no substantial business is being
conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real
property and activities incidental thereto.112
Classification of a SARE case is relevant in several respects, particularly
because of its effect on the operation of the automatic stay of § 362. If a creditor
has secured claims in "single asset real estate," it can obtain relief from the
109. Cohn, supra note 16, at 525. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did not introduce the
phrase "single asset real estate" into bankruptcy cognizance. It is a common term in bankruptcy
and has been used for many years in the bankruptcy area:
Single asset Chapter 11 cases have been filed in rapidly increasing numbers in recent
years. Hit by real estate recessions in the mid 1970's and mid 1980's, innumerable
single asset partnerships and corporations, formed only to acquire and manage their one
investment asset, have sought the protection of the bankruptcy court. Often filed with
little purpose but to postpone foreclosure, and with no serious hope of reorganization,
single asset cases have met harsh reactions from many courts.
Single asset bankruptcy cases are not new. They first blossomed under Chapter XII of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which was enacted as a part of the Chandler Act in 1938.
Chapter XII, entitled "Real Property Arrangements by Persons Other Than
Corporations," was precipitated by the then-common situation in which an individual or
partnership owned real estate for which it was obligated on bond issues secured by trust
indentures and owned by large numbers of individual holders. Although Chapter XII
was not limited to "single asset" cases, most debtors who sought its protection owned a
single parcel of real estate, typically a developed property such as an apartment house or
office building. Increasing numbers of such individuals and partnerships found
themselves unable to pay their bond issues during the depression years of the 1930's,
particularly in Chicago and in some northeastern cities. Chapter XII was designed for
these individual and partnership debtors.
Id.at 523 24.
110. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, f 362.07[5].
111. Id.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2012).
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automatic stay to foreclose on the real estate if the debtor fails to file a plan
within a shortened amount of time or make specified monthly payments under §
362(d)(3). 113 "The purpose that § 362(d)(3) serves is, where there is a single
asset real estate Chapter 11 case, to impose an expedited time frame for filing a
plan."114 The plan in such a case must be filed within ninety days after the filing
of the case.115 This requirement is significant in two respects. "First, it sets a
time for filing a plan in this species of Chapter 11 case."11 6 In fact, "[t]here is no
time requirement in the Bankruptcy Code for the filing of a plan for any other
kind of Chapter 11 case." 117 "Second, the consequence of not meeting that
'
requirement is that the automatic stay of § 362 may be lifted without ado." 118
Using the Bankruptcy Code definition, courts have adopted three
requirements necessary for characterizing a debtor's case as a SARE case:
(1) The debtor must have real property constituting a single property
or project (other than residential real property with fewer than 4
residential units), (2) which generates substantially all of the gross
income of the debtor, and (3) on which no substantial business is
conducted other than the business of operating real property and
11 9
activities incidental thereto.
"If a debtor fails to meet any prong, it is not a [single asset real estate
debtor] ."120
SARE cases share a few other commonalities: "(1) There is usually 'a single
secured creditor, which is at war with the debtor and which will not go along
with any proposal made by the debtor,' (2) foreclosure on the real property is
imminent (SARE cases are usually filed on the eve of foreclosure), (3) there
exists a handful of trade creditors with nominal claims, (4) there is likely 'a year
or two of unpaid real property taxes,' and (5) 'the secured debt dwarfs the value
of the real property,' leaving the secured creditor with a large, unsecured
121
deficiency claim.
Because of these commonalities - particularly the large looming deficiency
claim - the SARE debtor has a critical need to isolate the secured creditor's
deficiency claim from the other creditors and then work towards "impairing" its
122
friendly class of claims and soliciting their affirmative vote in favor of its plan.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

§ 362(d)(3).
In re Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47, 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Scotia Pacific Co., LLC, 508 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting § 101(51B)).
ILd. (emphasis added).
Clemancy & Marsh, supra note 95, at 21.
See id.
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B. ClassificationManeuvering
Because a class of claims accepts a plan if more than one-half in number and
at least two-thirds in amount of claims voting in a class favor the plan, 123 a
debtor's composition of its classes clearly has a substantial impact upon its
chances of successfully cramming down a plan. In SARE cases, it almost always
behooves the debtor to separately classify the mortgagees' deficiency claims
from the other unsecured claims, since the sheer size of a typical deficiency
claim would generally allow the deficiency claimant to block confirmation by
controlling the vote of a single unsecured creditor class. 124 Under this common
scenario, there would be no impaired accepting class under § 1129(a)(10) and
the SARE debtor would be barred from confirming its plan. Consider the
following example:
Big Bank (Bank) makes a $6 million loan to D&M Developments, LLC
(D&M), secured by a first mortgage on an office complex, which is D&M's sole
asset. The office complex generates all of D&M's income. D&M is unable to
service the debt and defaults under the loan. Bank schedules a foreclosure sale.
On the eve of the scheduled sale, D&M files for bankruptcy under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, and designates its filing as a SARE case. At that time,
general unsecured trade creditors are owed $100,000. D&M paid down the loan
by $1 million before it defaulted, so the principal balance at filing was $5
million.
D&M (now the debtor-in-possession) wants to file a plan of
reorganization where it will retain the property, pay general unsecured trade
creditors 90% of their claims on the effective date of the plan, without interest,
and restructure the $5 million balance into a new note with more favorable terms.
But the $5 million secured claim really might not be a fully secured claim under
bankruptcy law, which will affect how the debtor structures its plan.
Assume the value of the property is $3 million. Under § 506(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, this gives Bank a bifurcated claim in D&M's bankruptcy
case, since a lender's secured claim is limited to the value of its collateral and
any difference between the amount of the debt and the value of the collateral,
that is, the deficiency, is deemed an unsecured claim. Thus, in this example,
Bank's claim against the estate would be treated as follows: (1) a secured claim
of $3 million (i.e., the value of the property) and (2) an unsecured claim of $2
million (i.e., the deficiency). Under the Bankruptcy Code, these are considered
separate claims and will be placed in separate classes because they are in no way
substantially similar. 125 D&M has two options for classification:

123. § 1126(c).
124. James Lawniczak, Separate Classification of Deficiency Claims in Chapter 11 Plans,
LEXISNEXIS (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/bankruptcylb/bankruptcylaw-blog/archive/2012/10/31/separate-classification-of-deficiency-claims-in-chapter- 11 -plans.as
px.
125. See In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525, 536 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
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Option 1:126

Class 1: Bank's Secured Claim: $3 million
Class 2: Unsecured Claims: $2,100,000 (i.e., $2 million deficiency +
$100,000 trade)
Option 2:127
Class 1: Bank's Secured Claim: $3 million
Class 2: Bank's Unsecured Claim: $2 million
Class 3: Trade Creditors: $100,000
D&M will never go with Option 1 if the Bank makes it known that it will vote
against its plan both in its capacity as a secured creditor and as an unsecured
creditor. D&M will also not find Option 1 attractive if it promised to pay that
class 90% of their claims, since it will be required to provide the Bank's
128
deficiency claim with the same treatment as the other claims in that class.
More importantly, however, is that under Option 1, the Bank's unsecured
deficiency claim will swamp Class 2, making it impossible for Class 2 to meet
the one-half in number and at least two-thirds in amount requirement for an
accepting class. Thus, Option 2 is really the only option available for D&M.
Under Option 2, however, Class 1 and Class 2 can reject the plan, but now
Class 3 can accept it. Class 3 is likely to accept the plan since they are being
paid nearly in full. If this separate classification is proper, the trade creditors
will constitute the needed impaired accepting class necessary to satisfy §
1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. In other words, the class representing 2%
of D&M debt will determine whether the plan gets confirmed.
Based on this simple example, it is not surprising that the SARE debtor
searches for ways to flexibly classify the deficiency claim, a flexibility which is
vital to the effort to reorganize. The following cases are illustrative:
1. The ClassificationLoophole in In re Loop 76, LLC
In Wells FargoBank, N.A. v. Loop 76, LLC (In re Loop 76, LLC), 129 the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a bankruptcy court may consider
a third-party source (a guarantor) for recovery on a creditor's unsecured
deficiency claim when determining whether claims are "substantially similar"
under § 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, thus justifying a debtor's classification
of the deficiency claim separate from the claims of other unsecured creditors.13

126. See James Lawniczak, Separate Classificationof Deficiency Claims in Chapter]] Plans,
LEXISNEXIS (Oct. 31, 2012, 1:23 PM), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/bankruptcy/
b/bankruptcy-law-blog/archive/2012/10/3 1/separate-classification-of-deficiency-claims-in-chapte
r- 11 -plans.aspx.
127. See id.
128. See § 1123(a)(4).
129. Loop 76, LLC., 465 B.R. at 525.
130. Id. at 528.
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The facts of In re Loop are rather simple. In re Loop was a SARE case that
involved an undersecured lender. Loop 66's sole asset was an office/retail
complex. 1 Wells Fargo had provided Loop 66 with a $23 million construction
loan, which was secured by the office complex, and which was also personally
guaranteed by Loop 66's members.132 For voting purposes, Wells Fargo and the
debtor stipulated that the value of the office complex was $17 million, giving
Wells Fargo a bifurcated claim against the estate pursuant to § 506(a): (1) a
secured claim for $17 million and (2) an unsecured deficiency claim for $6
million. 133
The debtor's plan placed Wells Fargo's secured claim in Class 2, and its
deficiency claim in Class 8(B). 134 All of the other unsecured claims were placed
in Class 8(A).135 This separate classification allowed the debtor to obtain the
requisite impaired accepting class pursuant to § 1129(a)(10). 13 6 If Wells Fargo's
deficiency claim had been placed in Class 8(A) along with all other general
unsecured claims, it would have prevented the debtor's plan from being
confirmed.
Wells Fargo objected to the separate classification of its deficiency claim,
arguing that its claim was "substantially similar" to all other general unsecured
claims pursuant to § 1122(a) and, therefore, separate classification was
impermissible.1 3 The debtor, on the other hand, argued that Wells Fargo's
deficiency claim was dissimilar because it had potential recovery against thirdparty guarantors.138 This, the debtor argued, rendered Wells Fargo's unsecured
claim different in legal character as compared to Class 8(A) general unsecured
13 9
claims, allowing for separate classification.
The bankruptcy court agreed with the debtor.140 It held that "a claimant with
a third-party source of repayment for its claim is dissimilar from a claimant who
'
lacks such [an] alternative source[] of [recovery]. 141
Accordingly, the
bankruptcy court overruled Wells Fargo's objection and confirmed the plan. 142
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy
court's ruling.143 It agreed that possessing a separate course of recovery is
something different and distinct from other unsecured creditors with no similar
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 529.
ld.
Id. at 529
ld.
Id.
Id. at531
ld.
Id. at 531
See id.
Id. at 533
Id. at 533
Id. at 535
Id. at 541.

30.

32

34.
34.
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source. 1" Under its ruling, the court stated that bankruptcy courts should not be
limited to determining the "nature" of a claim's relation to the "assets of the
debtor," but that considering third-party sources of recovery is an appropriate
way to analyze the similarity of claims.14 5 Wells Fargo's pending lawsuit
against the guarantors, opined the court, rendered its unsecured deficiency
6
claims distinct from the debtor's other unsecured claims. 14
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision in In re Loop is at odds with other
cases, which hold that "the existence of a third-party guarantee does not change
the nature of a claim with respect to the debtor's estate." 14 7 Creditors should be
aware that, depending on the jurisdiction, plans with similar classification
schemes may have substantially dissimilar outcomes. A debtor's ability to
classify claims separately based on a third-party guaranty is arguably a loophole
which Congress did not intend to create.
If a guarantor is absent in the debtor's case or the debtor is otherwise unable
to use the guarantor argument as way to manufacture its classes, it has another
classification loophole to explore. This loophole necessitates examination of §
506(a) and § 1111(b).
2. The ClassificationLoophole in Non-Recourse Cases
In the example above involving D&M, it is obvious, given the size of Bank's
deficiency claim relative to the other unsecured claims and its opposition to
D&M's plan, why D&M needs to separately classify the Bank's deficiency
claim: it must satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a)(10) and get at least one
impaired class to accept the plan. 148 In this example, a finding by a court that
joint classification is necessary would be the death knell for D&M's plan
because it could not satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a)(10) and because Bank
refuses to accept its plan. But assume that the loan the Bank made to D&M is
nonrecourse - i.e., its recovery for default is limited to the real property pledged
by D&M. Does this fact provide D&M with an additional loophole to argue
separate classification is appropriate? The answer is: yes.
Because a claim in bankruptcy is secured only to the extent of the judicially
determined value of the collateral, § 506(a), in effect, bifurcates an otherwise
secured claim into a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an

144. Id.at 539-40.
145. Id.at 540.
146. Id.at 540-41.
147. Dana Hall, One of These Things is Not Like the Other; 9th Circuit B.A.P. Holds that
Bankruptcy Court May Consider the Existence of a Third-Party Source of Recovery When
Determining Whether Unsecured Claims are "Substantially Similar", WEIL BANKRUPTCY (March
15, 2012), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/claims/one-of-these-things-is-not-likethe-other-9th-circuit-b-a-p-holds-that-bankruptcy-court-may-consider-the-existence-of-a-third-par
ty-source-of-recovery-when-determining-whether-unsecured-claims-are/; see also In re Quigley
Co., Inc., 437 B.R. 102, 144 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
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unsecured claim for any deficiency, even if under state law the creditor's claim
is nonrecourse. 149 "Under [§] 11 1 (b)(1)(A), non-recourse claims secured by
liens on property of the estate . . . are treated as though they were recourse
claims, with the claimant having an unsecured claim against the debtor to the
extent of a deficiency.""15 The class holding such claims is given an option: it
may retain this recourse treatment or make the § 11 1 (b)(2) election pursuant to
which each claim in the class is considered
fully secured, despite the value of
151
the collateral being less than the claim.
Assume Bank chooses to bifurcate its claim. The classification scheme will
be identical to that discussed previously, despite the fact that it is a nonrecourse
loan. It will have a secured claim of $3 million (i.e., the value of the property)
and (2) an unsecured claim of $2 million (i.e., the deficiency). But now D&M
has a new quiver in its arrow - one, in fact, that it would not have if the loan
were recourse - to help it classify the bank's deficiency claim separately.
Debtor will argue that unsecured deficiency claims created by § 11 11 (b) are
not substantially similar to general unsecured claims and, therefore, separate
classification is mandatory. Courts that support this argument contend that "the
most obvious difference between a general unsecured claim and an unsecured
[deficiency] claim created by § 111 (b) is that the former exists regardless of
what chapter of the Bankruptcy Code the case is in, while the latter exists only
so long as the case remains in Chapter 11."152 In the abstract, this is true. If the
Chapter 11 case is converted to Chapter 7, the nonrecourse lender is confined to
its collateral for recovery and has no deficiency claim against the Chapter 7
estate. 153 This is also true if the bankruptcy case is dismissed. But is this
difference material enough to make these claims dissimilar? Another argument
courts make in favor of this position is "that [a creditor's] secured claim may
drive the manner in which it casts its unsecured deficiency claim ([perhaps
causing] it to cast its unsecured vote in a manner that has nothing to do with its
best interest as an unsecured creditor)" and, therefore, separate classification is
154
proper.
Other courts do not agree with this approach, holding that unsecured claims
and deficiency claims - regardless of their nonrecourse character - are
substantially similar. 155 "Since these are creditors of equal rank with equal rights
within chapter 11, . . . they should be classified together."'1 56 Moreover, courts
reject the voting-motive theory since it "focuses on the motives and agenda of
149.
150.
151.
152.
Assocs.,
153.
154.
155.
156.

§ 506(a).
In re 266 Washington Assoc., 141 B.R. 275, 283 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Id. at283 84.
In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202,219 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); In re Matter ofWoodbrook
19 F.3d 312, 318 (7th Cir. 1994).
§ 502(b)(1).
In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1019 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Id.
Ild.
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the claim holder rather than on the nature of the underlying claim. 15
Notwithstanding, this classification loophole has created a split of authority and
creditors should be aware that, depending on the jurisdiction, plans1with
similar
58
classification schemes may have substantially dissimilar outcomes.
C. Artificial Impairment
Inventive and manipulative classification is not the only loophole SARE
debtors are utilizing to confirm plans. Even if classification is proper- i.e., even
if the debtor is allowed to classify separately the lender's deficiency claim from
other general unsecured claims - the debtor still must have at least one
"impaired" class accepting the plan pursuant to § 1129(a)(10). 159 This condition
to confirmation requires further creativity for the SARE debtor.
In the D&M hypothetical, assume that D&M is allowed to separately classify
Bank's deficiency claim of $2 million from the trade creditors' claims of
$100,000. On the effective date of the plan, the debtor proposes to pay trade
creditors' 90% of their claims - i.e., $90,000 - and without interest. Why would
D&M not pay the trade creditors $100,000 with interest? The answer is simple.
If D&M offered full payment with interest, the trade creditor class would not be
"impaired" and, therefore, the § 1129(a)(10) requirement would not be met.
Assume D&M has sufficient funds to pay trade creditors in full on the effective
date, but has deliberately chosen the 10% haircut to obtain its impaired accepting
class for confirmation. Is this scheme allowed? Several courts, practitioners,
and scholars refer to this impairment manipulation as "artificial impairment" and
are split on whether it runs afoul of § 1129(a)(10). 160
The Bankruptcy Code presumes that a class of claims is "impaired" under a
plan unless a specific exception applies.16 1 One exception to the presumption of
impairment arises where the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and
contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim
or interest.116 2 Several courts have found that "Congress defined impairment in
the broadest possible terms. ' 163 The bankruptcy court found "impairment
157. 500 Fifth Ave. Assoc., 148 B.R. at 1019 20 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 3, 1122.03[1][b]) ("The focus on a particular claim should not be on the claim holder but
rather on the legal nature of the claim.").
158. See id. at 1020-21.
159. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
160. To date, the term "artificial impairment" shows up in 109 federal cases.
161. § 1124.
162. § 1124(1); Bank of Am. Nat '7Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship., 526 U.S.
434, 441 n. 14 ("Claims are unimpaired if they retain all of their prepetition legal, equitable, and
contractual rights against the debtor."); United States v. Graham, 59 Fed. Appx. 660, 664 (6th Cir.
2003).
163. In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 418 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting Di Pierro v.
Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24,28 (2d Cir. 1982)); L & JAnaheim Assoc. v. Kawasaki Leasing lnt ',Inc., 995
F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, 1124.03, at
1124-27.

2018]

SARE Manipulation

apparently can be of nominal financial significance, since Congress rejected the
Commission's recommendation that impairment be deemed to exist only if the
'
class is material and adversely affected."164
Artificial impairment generally refers to "[t]he manipulation of classes of
165
claims in order to artificially create an accepting class of impaired claims.
Courts, scholars and practitioners oftentimes confuse artificial impairment with
what is described above as "artificial classification" - i.e., a debtor's attempt to
separate classes of claims/creditors who otherwise could have been grouped into
one class, purely for the purpose of creating an accepting class to support the
Chapter 11 plan.1 66 But the proper use of the term "artificial impairment" refers
to a scenario "where a debtor deliberately 'impairs a de minimis claim' solely
for the purpose of achieving a forced confirmation over the objection of a
'1 6
creditor." 7
One of the leading cases criticizing artificial impairment is Windsor on the
River Associates v. Balcor Real Estate Finance.168 In that case, the debtor
owned an apartment complex that secured a $9.35 million mortgage and note
held by Balcor, the only secured creditor. 169 The debtor also owed debts to one
individual amounting to approximately $59,000 in addition to $13,000 owed to
34 trade creditors.1 71 When the debtor filed its plan, these became Classes 1, 2,
and 3, respectively. 1 Class 1 was impaired because the plan extended the term
of the note from four to ten years, with a cash payment of $500,000 on the plan's
effective date.1 2 Classes 2 and 3 were allegedly impaired because these classes
would not be paid in full until 60 days after the plan's effective date.1 3 Despite
Balcor holding over 99% of the money value of the creditors' claims, the District
Court approved the plan because Class 3 (as the "impaired" non-insider class)
1
accepted the plan. 4
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that "a claim is not impaired [for purposes
of the 1129(a)(10) requirement] if the alteration of the rights in question arises
solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion."1 75 Under the Eighth Circuit's
164. In re 28th Legislative Dist. Cmty. Dev. Corp., No. 10 14804, 2011 WL 5509140, at *32
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011) (quoting 6 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 113:5
(2011)).
165. In re Griswold Bldg., LLC., 420 B.R. 666, 707 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009); see also In re
Trenton Ridge Investors, LLC, 461 B.R. 440, 464-65 (Banks. S.D. Ohio 2011).
166. See Clemancy & Marsh, supra note 95, at 21.
167. In re Swartville, LLC., No. 11-08676-8-SWH, 2012 WL 3564171, at *2 (quoting In re
Dunes Hotel Assocs., 188 B.R. 174, 184 (Bankr. S.C. 1995)).
168. In re Windsor on the River Assoc., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 131 32 (8th Cir. 1993).
169. Ild.
at 129.
170. Ild.
171. Ild.
172. Ild.
at 129 30.
173. ld.
at 129.
174. ld.
at 130.
175. Id. at 132.
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approach, § 1129(a)(10) 17recognizes impairment only to the extent it is driven by
some economic "need."- 6
Several courts have followed Windsor on the River - although not necessarily
adopting its reasoning - and have denied confirmation of Chapter 11 plans
impairing de minimis claims of some creditors for the purpose of contriving a
class to accept the plan. 17 7 These courts reasoned that allowing this kind of
manipulation undermines the policy of consensual reorganization expressed in
§ 1129(a)(10).171 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit stated "[t]he purpose of [§
1129(a)(10)] 'is to provide some indicia of support [for a plan] by affected
creditors and prevent confirmation where such support is lacking.'179
Other courts, however, including the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that
artificial impairment does not "run afoul" of § 1129(a)(10). i"' In In re L & J
Anaheim Associates,181 the Ninth Circuit held that § 1129(a)(10) does not
distinguish between discretionary and economically driven impairment,
observing that "the plain language of [§] 1124 says that a creditor's claim is
impaired' unless its rights are left 'unaltered' by the [p]lan," and that "[t]here
is no suggestion here that only alternations of a particular kind or degree can
'1 82
constitute impairment."
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.,183
"expressly reject[ed] Windsor and join[ed] the Ninth Circuit in holding that [3]
1129(a)(10) does not distinguish between discretionary and economically driven
impairment."1' 84 It held that "[b]y shoehorning a motive inquiry and materiality
requirement into § 1129(a)(10), Windsor warps the text of the Code, requiring a
court to "deem" a claim unimpaired for purposes of § 1129(a)(10) even though

176. Id. at 132 33.
177. In re Combustion Eng'g., 391 F.3d 190, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2004); In re All Land
Investments, LLC, 468 B.R. 676, 689 90 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); In re Daly, 167 B.R. 734, 736 37
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re N. Wash. Ctr. Ltd. P'ship., 165 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. D. Md.
1994); Willows ConvalescentCtrs. Ltd. P 'ship v. UNUMLife Ins. Co., 151 B.R. 220,222 (D. Minn.
1991); In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 39 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Club
Assocs., 107 B.R. 385, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
178. E.g., Windsor on the River, 7 F.3d at 131 32.
179. Id. at 131 (internal citation omitted).
180. See L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 943 (holding that § 1124 does not differentiate
between artificial and actual impairment of claims); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Hotel Assocs. of
Tucson, 165 B.R. 470, 475 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994); In re Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R.
213,240 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000) (holding that "[u]nder the statutory scheme for the classification and
treatment of claims, a plan proponent may impair a class of claims"); In re Duval Manor
Assocs., 191 B.R. 622, 628 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that "artificial impairment, while
perhaps not philosophically the better view, is nevertheless clearly permitted under the plain
meaning of the statute"); In re The Beare Co., 177 B.R. 886, 889 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).
181. L &JAnaheim Assocs., 995 F.2dat942-43.
182. Ild.
183. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2013).
184. ld.
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it plainly qualifies as impaired under § 1124."185 The court further held that
"Windsor's motive inquiry is also inconsistent with § 1123(b)(1), which
provides that a plan proponent 'may impair or leave unimpaired any class of
claim,' and does not contain any indication that impairment must be driven by
economic motives.- 186 Regarding Windsor's pronouncement that "Congress
enacted [§] 1129(a)(10) ...to provide some indicia of support [for a cramdown
plan] by affected creditors" and that "interpreting [§] 1124 literally would vitiate
this congressional purpose", the Fifth Circuit stated that "the Bankruptcy Code
must be read literally, and congressional intent is relevant only when the
statutory language is ambiguous.- 1 8 7 In support of this position, it stated that
even if it were to consider congressional intent in divining the meaning of §
1129(a)(10) and § 1124, "the scant legislative history on § 1129(a)(10) provides
virtually no insight as to the provision's intended role, and the Congress that
passed § 1124 considered and rejected precisely the sort of materiality
requirement that Windsor has imposed by judicial fiat." '
The last critique
offered by the Fifth Circuit is that Windsor "ignores the determinative role §
1129(a)(10) plays in the typical single-asset bankruptcy, in which the debtor has
a negative equity and the secured creditor receives a deficiency claim that allows
189
it to control the vote of the unsecured class."
In short, much like the classification issue, courts split on the role that §
1129(a)(10) and the impairment requirement play in Chapter 11 cases. 190 A
uniform approach to this issue is wanted.
III.

IMPROPER CLASSIFICATION AND ARTIFICIAL IMPAIRMENT UNDER A

GOOD-FAITH APPROACH
Improper classification and artificial impairment are often most apparent in
single asset real estate cases. Courts, practitioners, and scholars are continuously
at odds over the meaning of the code provisions that govern the concepts of
classification and impairment. The current approaches for dealing with these
sections, particularly in single asset real estate cases, yield confusion and
actually make the reorganization process needlessly complex, costly, and
unpredictable. Even more problematic is that the muddle surrounding these code
provisions is resulting in decisions which are contrary to the congressional intent
behind the Chapter 11 reorganization process.1 91 But courts do not need to
construe these code sections in order to make a determination of the improper
185. Id.
186. Id.at 245-46 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1) (2012)).
187. Id.
188. Id.at 246 (noting that Congress rejected proposed legislation that would have required a
creditor to be "materially and adversely affected" in order to gain the right to vote on a
reorganization under § 1124); see also id.at n.27.
189. Id.at 246.
190. See supra note 9.
191. See Vill.
at Camp Bowie, 710 F.3d at 246.
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classification and artificial impairment issues. Rather, improper classification
and artificial impairment should go to a debtor's good faith in proposing a plan
under § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code - i.e., improper classification and
artificial impairment should be nothing more than subdivisions of the good-faith
requirement mandated by the Bankruptcy Code.
A. The Meaning of Good-Faith in Chapter 11
Pursuant to § 1129(a)(3), the party seeking confirmation must show that "[t]he
92
plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law."
"Good faith" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code; however, as explained by
the Seventh Circuit:
Though the term "good faith," as used in [§] 1129(a)(3), is not defined
in the Bankruptcy Code, the term is generally interpreted to mean that
there exists "a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code."
...Thus, for purposes of determining good faith under [§] 1129(a)(3)
...the important point of inquiry is the plan itself and whether such
plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and
19 3
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
The good faith standard found in "[§] 1129(a)(3) speaks more to the process
of plan development than to the content of the plan.1 19 4 When considering the
good faith intentions of a Chapter 11 plan, the court looks to the circumstances
surrounding the plan's development including the debtor's pre-filing conduct. 195
The review of a plan's development allows "a court considerable discretion in
'
finding good faith. '"196
Moreover, "the bankruptcy court[s] [are] in the best
1 97
position to [ascertain] the good faith of the parties' proposals."
Notwithstanding, "the fact that a debtor proposes a plan in which it avails itself
of an applicable Code provision does not constitute evidence of bad faith."198
In short, "the important point of inquiry is the plan itself and whether such
plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of
192.

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).

193. In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 424 25 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal citations
omitted); see also Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that
"[t]he good-faith test means that the plan was proposed with 'honesty and good intentions' and
with 'a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected"') (quoting In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d
137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
194. In re Bush Industries, Inc., 315 B.R. 292, 304 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004).
195. See In re Madison HotelAssocs., 749 F.2d 410,425 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Jasik, 727 F.2d
1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1984); In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 13533, 2003 WL 23861928, at *51
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 207 B.R. 764, 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re
Resorts Int'l., Inc., 145 B.R. 412,469 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990); In re Toy & Sports Warehouse, Inc., 37
B.R. 141, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
196. In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 271 B.R. 228, 234 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
197. In re Matter of Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 853 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).
198. In re PPL Enters., Inc., 228 B.R. 339, 347 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998).

2018]

SARE Manipulation

'
the Bankruptcy Code."199
The additional factors courts have considered in
determining a debtor's good faith include whether "the plan has been proposed
with honesty and good intentions and with a basis for expecting that
reorganization can be effected, and [exhibits a] fundamental fairness in dealing
200
with the creditors.
Regarding the first factor, the United States Supreme Court has specifically
identified "preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to
satisfy creditors" as "the two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11."201
The second factor requires that the plan have been proposed with honesty and
good intentions, and that it have "a reasonable hope of success. ' 20 2 The Third
Circuit has provided guidance on this point, stating that, "[a]t its most
fundamental level, the good faith requirement ensures that the Bankruptcy
Code's careful balancing of interests is not undermined by 2petitioners
whose
aims are antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy. 3 In analyzing

whether a debtor's plan has been proposed for honest and good reasons, courts
regularly consider "whether the debtor intended to abuse the judicial process,"
whether the plan was proposed for ulterior motives, or if "no realistic possibility
for effective reorganization exists. 20 4
The third and final factor courts consider when considering a debtor's good
faith is if the debtor exhibited a fundamental unfairness when dealing with its
creditors. In order to comply with this requirement, the plan "must treat all
interested parties fairly and ... efforts used to confirm the plan must comport
20 5
with due process.1
For SARE cases, the Eleventh Circuit has enumerated the following factors
as indicative of bad faith:
(1) The debtor has only one asset, the Property, in which it does not
hold legal title;
(2) The debtor has few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in
relation to the claims of the Secured Creditors;
(3) The Debtor has few employees;
(4) The Property is the subject of a foreclosure action as a result of
arrearages on the debt;

199. Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d at 425.
200. In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 609 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
201. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'Ship., 526 U.S. 434, 453
(1999).
202. In re Sun Cty. Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1985).
203. In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 383 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004).
204. Matter of Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 853 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1988) (The court stated
"[t]o find a lack of 'good faith' courts have examined whether the debtor intended to abuse the
judicial process and the purposes of reorganization provisions").
205. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 39 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
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(5) The Debtor's financial problems involve essentially a dispute
between the Debtor and the Secured Creditors which can be resolved
in the pending State Court Action [if any]; and
(6) The timing of the Debtor's filing evidences an intent to delay or
frustrate the legitimate efforts of the Debtor's secured creditors to
enforce their rights.20 6
20 v
The above factors are not exhaustive, and no single factor is determinative.
A Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Georgia has proposed a more
extensive list of factors to consider in determining whether a petition was filed
in good faith:
(1) Whether the debtor has few or no unsecured creditors;
(2) Whether there has been a previous bankruptcy petition by the
debtor or a related entity;
(3) Whether the pre-petition conduct of the debtor has been improper;
(4) Whether the petition effectively allows the debtor to evade court
orders;
(5) Whether there are few debts to non-moving creditors;
(6) Whether the petition was filed on the eve of foreclosure;
(7) Whether the foreclosed property is the sole or major asset of the
debtor;
(8) Whether the debtor has no ongoing business or employees;
(9) Whether there is no possibility of reorganization;
(10) Whether the debtor's income is not sufficient to operate;
(11) Whether there was no pressure from non-moving creditors;
(12) Whether reorganization essentially involves the resolution of a
two-party dispute;
(13) Whether a corporate debtor was formed and received title to its
major assets immediately before the petition; and
208
(14) Whether the debtor filed solely to create the automatic stay.
Many of these factors will be present in SARE cases. A majority of SARE
cases have only a few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in relation to
the claims of the secured creditor (i.e., the mortgagee).20 9 Most SARE debtors
only have a few employees. SARE debtors often file cases days before the
mortgagee's scheduled foreclosure on the real property. These factors will likely
taint the reorganization proposal of a SARE debtor and may be enough to cause
the proposed plan to fail the good faith requirement of § 1 129(a)(3).

206.
207.
208.
209.

In re Phoenix Piccadilly Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 95 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id.at 1394.
Nw. Place, Ltd. v. Cooper, 73 B.R. 978, 981 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).
Cohn, supra note 16, at 527.
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When it comes to classification and impairment issues, particularly in SARE
cases, courts should focus their attention on the good-faith requirement set forth
in the Bankruptcy Code.
B. Classificationand Good Faith
Section 1122(a) expressly provides that only substantially similar claims may
be placed in the same class.2 10 It does not, however, expressly require that all
substantially similar claims be placed in the same class, nor does it expressly
prohibit substantially similar claims from being classified separately. Several
courts, however, hold that § 1122 "must contemplate some limits on
classification of claims of similar [rights]. 2 1
This creates complexity and
unpredictability.
Courts should consider avoiding the statutory construction of section 1122,
and instead turn more towards notions of basic fairness and good faith. Most
courts agree that separate classification of substantially similar claims is usually
212
done to ensure that at least one impaired class of creditors accepts the plan.
When this occurs, this manipulation should be viewed as an abuse of Chapter
11, thereby invoking the good-faith analysis of § 1 129(a)(3), not an analysis and
construction of § 1122. Under a good-faith approach, for example, separate
classification of an unsecured deficiency claim created by § 1111(b) from
general unsecured claims solely to create an accepting creditor class would
likely be impermissible under § 1129(a)(3), but arguably not under 1122(a).
Indeed, several courts have held that unsecured deficiency claims created by §
1111 (b) are substantially similar to general unsecured claims, while other courts
reject this conclusion and have held that these claims are not substantially similar
to other unsecured claims, and thus separate classification of those claims is not
213
only permissible, but mandatory.
Sorting out the validity of the various lines of reasoning for separation of
substantially similar claims is futile because § 1122 is not ambiguous. As one
judge observed: "[§] 1122 allows a claim or interest to be placed in a particular
class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or
interests of such class. It does not require that similar classes be grouped
together but merely that any group be homogenous.1 21 4 The legislative history
of § 1122 arguably creates confusion about creative or manipulative

210. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012).
211. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1278 79 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 821 (1992); see also In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 216 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
212. See Emmons, supra note 108, § 2.
213. See e.g., SM 104 Ltd. 160 B.R. at 221 (holding that deficiency claims created by § 1111(b)
were required to be classified separately under § 1122(a)); Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at
1280 (noting the high likelihood of detrimental effect on parties making deficiency claims); In re
Woodbrook Associates, 19 F.3d 312, 318 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing the different interpretations
among the circuit courts).
214. In re AG Consultants Grain Div., Inc., 77 B.R. 665, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
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classification because § 1122 purported to be a codification of existing case law
and pre-code case law was inconsistent. However, a straightforward reading of
§ 1122 should settle any debate. Some judges agree:
"[A] plan proponent under § 1122:
(1) may have the flexibility to place claims of a similar nature in
different classes; and
215
(2) may not place claims of a dissimilar nature in the same class.
The author agrees with this reasoning simply because the statute is
unambiguous. The real issue, in the author's opinion, always becomes one of
good faith - i.e., has the debtor demonstrated that the separate classification of
substantially similar claims is in good faith. These created classes should be
heavily scrutinized to prevent abuse. But to be clear: creation of separate classes
of substantially similar claims is not an abuse of the classification systems under
section 1122. Rather, it goes to the heart of the good-faith analysis under §
1129(a)(3).
If a creditor objects to the classification scheme on gerrymandering grounds,
most courts require the plan proponent to justify the classification.2 16 The author
agrees the plan proponent should justify the classification, but thinks the order
prescribed by courts is backwards, particularly in SARE cases. Why is the onus
on the creditor to point out the debtor's improper classification attempt? The
author believes courts should require SARE debtors to articulate in their
proposed plans why deficiency claimants are not being grouped with other
unsecured creditors. In other words, the author would push for a presumption
in SARE cases that when a SARE debtor separately classifies unsecured
deficiency claims - whether created by § 1111 (b) or otherwise - it is not
exhibiting a fundamental fairness in dealing with creditors as required by §
1129(a)(3). Under this approach, the SARE debtor must overcome the
presumption of bad faith and justify any separate classification of deficiency

215. ld.; see also In re City of Colo. Springs Spring Creek General Imp. Dist., 187 B.R. 683,
687 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995).
The express language of § 1122 imposes only one requirement that claims in a given
class be substantially similar to each other. There is no requirement that all substantially
similar claims be placed in the same class nor is there a prohibition against classifying
substantially similar claims separately. Almost all courts interpreting § 1122(a)
recognize that it does not prohibit separate classification of similar claims, yet many
courts... have augmented § 1122(a) to impose restrictions on a plan proponent's ability
to separate similar claims.).
Id.
216. See Dean, 166 B.R. 949, 952 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1994) (debtor must demonstrate reasons
apart from gerrymandering to separately classify); In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997) (business or economic justification required); In re
Tucson Self Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892, 898 (9th Cir. 1994) (placed justification burden on
debtor); In re Heritage Org., LLC, 375 B.R. 230, 303 04 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (discussing
when separate classification justified); see also City of Colo. Spring Creek, 187 B.R. at 688, n.
4 (collecting cases).
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claims from unsecured claims. If the debtor rebuts the presumption by showing
either (i) that the claims are not substantially similar, or (ii) even if they are
substantially similar claims, that they were not separately classified to
gerrymander a consenting class of impaired claims, the burden shifts to the
creditor to show abuse. Analyzing separate classification issues in this way
protects creditors from gerrymandering and other improper classification
attempts, while avoiding the squabbling over the meaning of the text of §
1122(a). It also makes the confirmation process more efficient. In most cases,
if the debtor separately classifies the deficiency claim from other unsecured
claims, the deficiency claimant is going to file a motion objecting to the
classification scheme.2 1
This motion will be followed by the debtor's
opposition brief. And the opposition brief will be followed by the deficiency
claimant's reply brief. Requiring the debtor to rationalize the separate
classification of the deficiency claim in the plan may avoid additional filings and
hearings on the matters.
Of course, justifying separate classification of deficiency claims from general
unsecured claims or proving that such claims are dissimilar is not an easy task.
This Article does not suggest a uniform approach for scrutinizing the debtor's
explanations or rationales for separate classification. It simply suggests that
good faith is the proper inquiry and a presumption of bad faith should exist in
SARE cases where the debtor separates deficiency claims from general
unsecured claims. However, in determining whether separate classification is
proper, courts could consider a few justifications or theories that the debtor
would be required to set forth in its plan.
First, a court may consider whether a "legitimate business reason" exists for
separately classifying the deficiency claim. 218 For example, a SARE debtor may
have a strong reason to place a contentious deficiency claimant in one class
separate from trade creditors. The routine extension of monthly services and
supplies by a group of trade creditors might be essential to the debtor's
reorganization efforts and ultimately to the survival and continuation of the
debtor's business. Trade creditors may also benefit from a continuing
relationship with the debtor. The same may not be true for an unsecured
deficiency claimant. In In re Richard Buick, Inc., 2 19 a car dealership's plan
proposed to pay its dealer-trader claims in full while its other general unsecured
claims would receive a five percent distribution on their claims. The court found
that there was sufficient justification to segregate the dealer claims and offer
them superior treatment:
[The witnesses] testified without rebuttal that full payment of dealertrade claims was absolutely necessary to the future success of the

217. Dean, 166 B.R. at 952; see e.g., Tucson Self Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. at 895
(Merabank/RTC filed an objection to the classification plan).
218. Barakat, 99 F.3dat 1525.
219. In re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
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Debtor's business. Not only was it needed to re-establish a good
relationship with other dealers whose trades would supply a large
percentage of the vehicles sold, but also this treatment was needed
because both of the franchisees willing to resume a relationship with
the Debtor, i.e., Buick and Volvo, had made full payment of dealertrade claims a prerequisite of their continuing respective future
relationships with the Debtor. Therefore, the Debtor had good reason
for allowing the degree of favorable treatment allotted to these
20
parties?
22 1
In In re Georgetown Ltd. Partnership,
the court concluded that the separate
classification of an undersecured lender's deficiency claim from the claims of
trade creditors was appropriate because it was a significantly larger claim and
would have to be repaid over a longer period of time. 222 Additionally, the court
found that the debtor intended to have a continuing relationship with its trade
223
creditors but not the lender.
Second, the debtor may be able to point to differing interests in the plan. Some
creditors, such as deficiency claimants, may have different interests in plans
from other unsecured creditors. This type of interest has been referred to as
"non-creditor interests" and a number of courts allow for separate
classification.2 24
Indeed, "[a] non-creditor interest can justify separate
classification if it gives [the creditor] a different stake in the future viability of
[the debtor] that may cause it to vote for reasons other than its economic interest
225
in the claim.
Lastly, the debtor could attempt to articulate why the deficiency claim is
legally dissimilar from general unsecured claims - i.e., why the Bankruptcy
Code mandates their separateness.
This approach, however, is highly
unpredictable given the strong split amongst the courts. 226 If the SARE debtor
files its Chapter 11 case in the Ninth Circuit, for example, and the mortgagee
has a third-party source of recovery for its claim (i.e., from a guarantor), the
SARE debtor may be able to overcome the presumption by simply articulating
in its plan, and citing to In re Loop, that such claims are dissimilar. 227 This,
alone, could rebut the bad-faith presumption, as the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

220. Id. at 852.
221. In re Geo. Ltd. P'ship., 209 B.R. 763, 771 72 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1997).
222. Id.at 772.
223. Id.at 772
224. Id.at 771 72.
225. In re Tex. Star Refreshments, LLC., 494 B.R. 684, 696 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013); see
also In re Lightsquared,Inc., 513 B.R. 56, 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (separate classification is
justified where claimant is a competitor of the debtor); In re Premiere Network Servs., Inc., 333
B.R. 130, 133 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 2005) (a non-creditor interest in the reorganized debtor meets the
"good business reason" and justifies separate classification of the creditor's claim).
226.
227.

See Barakat, 99 F.3d at 1524 26.
In re Loop 76, LLC., 465 B.R. 525, 541 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
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for the Ninth Circuit holds that possessing a separate course of recovery is
something different and distinct from other unsecured creditors with no similar
source." 8 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, there would be no hurdle to overcome
regarding separate classification of substantially similar claims, since these
deficiency claimants with third-party sources of recovery are, by judicial
precedent, legally dissimilar. Without a guarantor in the mix, however, the
debtor would be required to articulate a legitimate business reason or non29
creditor interest rationale for the separate classification.
Similarly, where the unsecured deficiency claim was created by § 1111(b)
(i.e., a non-recourse deficiency claim), a SARE debtor may be able to overcome
the bad-faith presumption by arguing that unsecured deficiency claims created
by § 1111(b) are not substantially similar to general unsecured claims and,
therefore, separate classification is mandatory. 2 0 Some courts agree with this
line of reasoning, while other courts hold that unsecured claims and deficiency
claims - regardless of their nonrecourse character - are substantially similar and
should be classified together. 21 Like the third-party source argument, the §
1111 (b) rationale for separate classification is jurisdictional and the outcomes
are unpredictable. Notwithstanding, the good-faith examination puts a justified
burden on the SARE debtor to articulate why deficiency claims are dissimilar
from general unsecured claims or why separate classification is justified. This
requirement should curb abuse in SARE cases and make confirmation more
efficient and less costly for creditors.
C. Impairment and Good Faith
Like the classification issue, courts do not need to construe § 1124 and §
1129(a)(10) in order to make a determination of the artificial impairment issue.
232
The issue comes down to the debtor's good faith in proposing such a plan.
Indeed, an artificial impairment analysis requires an inquiry into the debtor's
motives and courts are finding this argument more persuasive than simply
233
attacking the language and meaning of § 1129(a)(10).
In In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,234 for example, the debtor proposed a
plan in which the trade claims were not paid in full. Bank of America argued,
in part, that the only reason for not paying the trade creditors in full was to create
an impaired class that would vote to accept the plan. The Seventh Circuit stated:

228. See id. at 540-41.
229. Ld.
at 538.
230. Ld.
at 529 30.
231. In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assoc., 148 B.R. 1010, 1019 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
232. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship., 126 F.3d 955, 968 69 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub
nor., Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship., 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
233. Ld.at 968.
234. Ld. at 959, 963-64.
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Although we have never before adopted the Eighth Circuit's "artificial
impairment" test, we believe that, even assuming that the Eighth
Circuit's interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) is the appropriate standard,
the bankruptcy court did not err in its application here. We have noted,
in discussing In re Windsor, that "[a] finding of 'artificial impairment'
requires an inquiry into the purposes of the debtor." In re
Windsor recognizes that the question of motivation is one for the
bankruptcy court, whose resolution of the question is entitled to
deference ....The bankruptcy court found that there were legitimate
reasons for impairing the trade claims class. Impairing these claims
allowed more money to be dedicated to the successful reorganization
of the debtor. The court distinguished this situation from the one at
issue in In re Windsor in which the only impairment was to wait 60
days to pay the "artificially impaired" class in full, and the debtor's
only purpose for doing so ... was to create an impaired class to
approve the plan. In short, the bankruptcy court explicitly found that
there was no lack of good faith by LaSalle's failure to pay the trade
claims in full. We are not left with the definite and firm conviction
that the bankruptcy court has made a mistake with respect to this
2 5
issue. 1
Another case in the Seventh Circuit addressed artificial impairment under §
1129(a)(10), but focused on good faith and the debtor's motivations. 2 6 In In re
Greenwood Point, LP,23 7 the debtor separately classified a secured tax claim,
and proposed deferred interest payments of $12,442.80 on the claim over two
months after the effective date of the plan, despite having sufficient funds to pay
the amount on the effective date. 238 A creditor objected on the basis that the
claim was artificially impaired for the sole purpose of obtaining acceptance by
at least one impaired class pursuant to § 1129(a)(10).2 3 9 The court first found
that "[i]f motivation of the debtor was to alter treatment of a class solely to obtain
plan approval by at least one impaired class, and for no legitimate business
purpose, the class is artificially impaired and its acceptance cannot be used to
satisfy Section 1129(a)(10).""24 The court further found that "nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code prevents a debtor from negotiating
a plan in order to gain
acceptance, including impairment of claims. ' 241 "[A] plan proponent may
impair a class of claims" and "[i]f the impaired class accepts the plan, the
242
requirement of [§] 1129(a)(10) is satisfied.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.at 968.
In re Greenwood Point, LP, 445 B.R. 885, 907 08, 912 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011).
ld.
at 892.
ld.
ld. at 907-08.
ld. at 908.
ld.
ld.
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Like classification, the author believes impairment of claims should be subject
to the good faith requirement under § 1129(a)(3). Courts continue to take
different views on de minimis impairment of claims under § 1129(a)(10).
Engaging in a good faith analysis and focusing on the debtor's motives is
consistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and avoids the disorder
243
created by focusing on the language of § 1124 and § 1129(a)(10).
The author does not necessarily contend that artificial impairment constitutes
bad faith as a matter of law, but argues that, like the classification issue, a
presumption of bad faith should exist in SARE cases when artificial impairment
is present. The author suggests a SARE debtor can overcome this presumption
by demonstrating, in its proposed plan of reorganization, that the proposed
impairment is necessary for economical reasons and not just to achieve a cram
down over the objecting creditor. This presumption and burden require the
debtor to provide evidence in its plan concerning a valid, economical reason
concerning the impairment of the class. 2 " Several recent cases seem to support
245
this position.
In a 2016 case, Village Green I, GP v. Fannie Mae (In re Village Green I,
GP),2 46 the debtor owed its former lawyer and accountant a total of less than
$2,400. The debtor created a separate class for those two creditors and impaired
the class by proposing to pay the claims in full over sixty days rather than up
front.2 4 The Debtor argued that the impairment was justified by the debtor's
need to "ration every dollar. ' 248 The court found the debtor's reasoning
"dubious," and held that the separate classification of the claims violated §
1129(a)(3)'s good faith requirement.24 9 The only other creditor in Village Green
was Fannie Mae, a secured creditor that was owed $8.6 million.2 5 0 There were
no other unsecured creditors. Furthermore, the debtor's expected monthly net
income after confirmation was $71,400, which the court found was more than
enough to pay de minimis claims of $2400.251
In In re RYYZ, LLC,2 5 2 the court discussed indicia of impermissible artificial
impairment, which, again, would go to the issue of good faith. In RYYZ, the
court found that "based on the [d]ebtor's current projections and/or the purported

243. 1d. at 913.
244. See KCB Bank N.V. v. Capitol Lakes, Inc., Nos. 16-cv-266-wmc, 16-cv-468-wmc, 2016
WL 5394767, at *18 19 (W.D. Wis. 2016); In re RAMZ Real Estate Co., LLC., 510 B.R. 712,717
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
245. See KCB Bank N.V., 2016 WL 5394767, *18 19; RAMZ Real Estate Co., LLC., 510 B.R.
at 717.
246. In re Vill. Green I, GP, 811 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2016).
247. Id. at 818.
248. Id.at 819.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 818.
251. Id.at 819.
252. In re RYYZ, LLC., 490 BR. 29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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ability of the [d]ebtor's principles to contribute $250,000, it would appear that
253
the debtor" could quite easily pay the impaired amount of the claim at issue.
In other words, proof that a debtor can "pay a higher claim if necessary was
'fatal to [the debtor's] argument that a valid business reason motivated the
proposed' impairment of a lesser claim."' 254 The court further noted that the
"impaired" claim "is a mere 1.7 percent of' of the objecting creditor's total
claim. 255 The court also found that "[u]nder these circumstances allowing [the
de minimis class] to be used to cramdown [the] plan over [the objecting creditor]
was 'simply inconsistent with the principles underlying the Bankruptcy
Code. ",256
In In re Swartville2 7 the court denied confirmation of the debtor'sCchapter
11 plan upon finding that it failed to satisfy the good faith requirement of §
1129(a)(3). 258 In that case, with the exception of the objecting large secured
creditor, "the debtor [scheduled] only four non-insider unsecured creditors...
[with] claims total[ing] $8,901. ,,259 Only one ballot was cast in that class, an
acceptance from a creditor with a claim of $1,170, failing which, the debtor
260
would not have been able to effectuate a cramdown of the secured creditor.
Moreover, the original amount of the loan was $1,615,000 and the secured
creditor's claim totaled $1,624,530, suggesting that very few payments had been
made prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. 261 Lastly, and of great significance
to the court, the plan provided for payment of the unsecured claims within 60
days of the plan's effective date by the guarantors; however, one of the
guarantors testified that he could pay those claims immediately, and actually
offered to do so during the hearing. 262 The evidence in that case strongly
supported a finding of bad faith, resulting in denial of confirmation.
In another case also decided in 2016, a debtor's plan was not confirmable both
because of improper classification and artificial impairment. 263 In In re
Autterson, one of the creditors, Sherman & Howard, was allegedly owed
$10,000.264 In a surprisingly common situation, "Sherman & Howard never filed
a proof of claim against the [d]ebtor", yet the debtor listed it on its schedules as
an undisputed debt "of exactly $10,000 - 'not a penny more, not a penny

253. Id. at43.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. In re Swartville, LLC., No. 11-08676-8-SWH, 2012 WL 3564171 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug.
17, 2012).
258. Id. at *4
259. Id. at *5
260. Id.
261. Id.at*1
262. Id.at *1, *6.
263. In re Autterson, 547 B.R. 372, 379 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016).
264. Id.at 380.
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less."' 265 Sherman & Howard had also represented the debtor in several
matters.2 66 The debtor placed Sherman & Howard in an "administrative
convenience" class separate from other unsecured claims and "proposed
to pay
7
[it] 80% of [its] claim (i.e., only $8,000 instead of $10,000)".26
The court held that "the [d]ebtor's plan [was] unconfirmable because the
obvious purpose of the improper classification was to manipulate and
gerrymander acceptance of the plan.1 268 In fact, the court stated that "the
[d]ebtor created a bogus and artificially impaired administrative convenience
class to gerrymander consent. ' 269 The court noted that small administrative
expense classes are normal in bankruptcy cases because it allows a plan to reduce
the number of creditors eligible to vote. 2 70 "This result", the court stated, "is
accomplished by offering creditors holding small claims of perhaps a few
hundred dollars each a 100% payment and thus providing that they are not
impaired." ' 27 1 The court found that "[b]y doing so, the debtor avoids the cost of
sending disclosure statements, soliciting votes from the de minimis creditors,
and making fractional distributions."12 72 But that is not what the debtor did in
Autterson. It "did the opposite."'273 It "decided to pay [its law firm] only 80%
(instead of 100%) of the []claim in order to create an impaired class that could
vote in favor [of its plan].2 74 The court noted that "there may be legitimate
reasons not to propose full payment in some proceedings" but "the debtor
offered no evidence or explanation to justify creating the separate administrative
convenience class and them impairing it."' 27 ' Thus, "the court easily conclude [d]
2
that the [d]ebtor artificially impaired" that class of claims. 76
Based on the foregoing, the author offers two conclusions when impairment
of de minimis claims exist in SARE cases. First, the issue of artificial
impairment goes to § 1 129(a)(3). Second, economic justification for impairment
should be the sole factor in the good faith determination. Some courts appear to
be following this good-faith analysis with economic considerations. For
example, in a case focusing on good faith and inquiring into the motives of the
debtor for creating and impairing a small class, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Central District of California stated that "this smells ... like a device to create

265. ld.
at 395.
266. ld.
at 394.
267. ld.
at 395 97.
268. ld.
at 396.
269. Ild.
270. Ild.
at 397 (citing In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 32 B.R. 106, 108 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
271.
ld.
at 397.
272. ld.
273. ld.
274. ld.
275. ld.
276. ld.
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an impaired consenting class."12 7 7 The court noted that "a doctrine has emerged
that that 'artificial impairment' is a form of gerrymandering and when abusively
used is held to be antithetical to the good faith which must be at the center of
any reorganization effort."12 7 8 As such, the court held that "the plan's proposal
in 'good faith' necessary under § 1129(a)(3) is consequently also left very much
in doubt. Debtor bears the burden on this and that burden is not carried." 21 7 9 The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit similarly stated that,
[w]here the plan contemplates the debtor's continuation in business
and the reasonable cash needs of that business - to meet accrued and
foreseeable expenses and to make reasonable provision for
contingencies - require some or all of the cash on hand that might
otherwise be paid to plan creditors on confirmation, that need justifies
the plan's deferment of payment to the plan creditors."'
Case law clearly supports the proposition that impairment of de minimis
claims without economic justification is relevant to the good-faith inquiry and,
indeed, antithetical to Chapter 11 reorganization. 81 The issue in these types of
277. In re NNN Parkway 400 26, LLC, 506 B.R. 277, 285 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 2014).
278. ld. (emphasis added).
279. ld.
280. Poncebank v. Mem'l Prods. Co., Inc., 212 B.R. 178, 184 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997).
281. When a court makes findings of bad faith under § 1129(a)(3) for improper classification
or artificial impairment, the analysis should not necessarily end. Findings of bad faith under §
1129(a)(3) may also support the conclusion that the votes associated with the impaired class should
be designated. Section 1126(e) provides:
On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may designate
any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not
solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1984).
The provision "grants the bankruptcy court discretion to sanction any conduct that taints
the voting process, whether it violates a specific provision or is in 'bad faith."' Century Glove, Inc.
v. First Am. Bank of New York, 860 F.2d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 1988). Like "good faith," "bad faith" is
also not defined and its meaning has been left for development under the case law. The cases have
generally recognized two types of bad faith: (1) "where a claimholder attempts to ... extort a
personal advantage not available to other creditors," or (2) "where the [claimholder] acts in
furtherance of an 'ulterior motive."' In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 421 B.R. 133, 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009); see In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 B.R. 839, 844 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). Although
the decisions generally focus on the voting creditor's motive, § 1126(e) is much broader: "it
provides a basis to designate, without regard to the creditor's motive, where the vote is 'solicited
or procured' in bad faith." In re Quigley Co., Inc., 437 B.R. 102, 130 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "procurement," as "[t]he act of getting or obtaining
something or bringing something about." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (9th ed. 2009).
Webster's has defined it similarly to mean "to get possession of," "to cause to happen or be done:
bring about," and "to prevail upon to do something indicated." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1809 (1981).

Does § 1126(e) give creditors an additional vehicle to thwart single-asset real estate cases
by "designating" votes "procured" or otherwise tainted by improper classification and artificial
impairment? The author argues it does. The consequence of a designation under § 1126(e) is that
the vote is disregarded in the counting of votes to determine whether a class has accepted or rejected
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cases is not whether the claims are impaired, as the Code defines them, but
whether the debtor impaired them without justification. Arguments about the
Code's definition of impairment and the proper construction of the statutory text
is ineffective and results in inconsistent case law.282 When improper impairment
is the issue, the debtor must address § 1129(a)(3). 2 83 As stated by the Fifth
Circuit, "though we reject the concept of artificial impairment as developed in
Windsor, we do not suggest that a debtor's methods for achieving literal
compliance with § 1129(a)(10) enjoy a free pass from scrutiny under §
1129(a)(3)." '284 Indeed, "a plan proponent's motives and methods for achieving
compliance with the voting requirement of § 1 129(a)(10) must be scrutinized, if
at all, under the rubric of § 1129(a)(3). '285 This level of scrutiny should be
heightened in SARE cases with a presumption of bad faith when impairment of
de minimis claims exists. This presumption can be overcome with evidence
showing economic justification for such impairment. This framework does not
operate decisively to block reorganization in SARE cases, but it should operate
to curtail abuses of the bankruptcy process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conflict over improper classification and artificial impairment is widely
prevalent in SARE cases.2 8 6 The current approaches developed by the courts
yield confusion and make the reorganization process in SARE cases needlessly
complex, costly, and unpredictable. 287 Courts can avoid these problems by
analyzing improper classification and artificial impairment issues under the
good-faith requirement found in § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, which
must be satisfied for the confirmation of any proposed plan of reorganization.2 88
Because there is a strong likelihood in SARE cases that isolation of deficiency
claims and impairment of friendly de minimis claims is being utilized for the

the plan. In re Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc., 388 B.R. 202, 230 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008). This
paper recognizes courts may have issues with this argument. Section 1126(e) does not specifically
refer to a bad faith creation of a claim as a basis to designate a vote. On a strict reading, it only
applies to bad faith in the solicitation or procurement of the vote, not to the creation of the claim
on which the vote is cast. Notwithstanding, the author believes procurement should be read broadly
and could stretch to implicate situations where the debtor purposefully creates a class an accepting
impaired class through improper classification or artificial impairment.
282. See supra notes 164-89 and accompanying text.
283. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d 239, 247-48 (5th Cir. 2013); see generally
supra notes 189 204.
284. Village at Camp Bowie, 710 F.3d at 239.
285. Id.at 247.
286. See supra Part IV (discussing improper classification and artificial impairment issues in
SARE cases).
287. See supra Part IV (noting that classification issues in SARE cases result in numerous
challenges to successful reorganization).
288. In re Village Green I, GP, 811 F.3d 816, 819 (6th Cir. 2016) (discussing the general
requirement that reorganization plans pass review under the § 1129(a)(3) good faith standard).
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sole purpose of achieving a forced confirmation over the objection of a truly
harmed creditor, a presumption should exist that the SARE debtor is not
exhibiting a fundamental fairness in dealing with its creditors as required by §
1129(a)(3). 28 9 With no explanation or justification, courts have been placing the
burden on creditors to prove that the debtor has not proposed its plan in good
faith, after which the burden shifts to the debtor to demonstrate the existence of
good faith in its proposal of its plan.2 90 This burden-shifting scheme particularly in SARE cases - is backwards and prejudicial to creditors. It should
be the debtor that shoulders the initial burden.
When it comes to separate classification of deficiency claims, the SARE
debtor may overcome the bad-faith presumption by showing that the deficiency
claim is either (1) not substantially similar to other unsecured claims or (ii) that
it is not being separately classified to gerrymander a consenting class of impaired
claims. 91 Similarly, de minimis impairment of claims under § 1129(a)(10)
would require the SARE debtor to provide evidence in its plan concerning a
valid, economical reason concerning the impairment of the class.2 92 Case law
supports this proposition and the abuse found in SARE cases warrants a change
293
and some uniformity.

289. See generally supra Part IV (analyzing how a new bad faith presumption would interact
with the current framework of Chapter 11 reorganization).
290. See supra note 215; see also In re Dean, 166 B.R. 949, 952 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1994); In re
Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997) (illustrating
generally the burden on creditors to challenge improper classifications).
291. See generally supra Part IV.
292. In re Tucson Self Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892, 898 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the
importance of a valid business or economic justification for a separate classification structure in a
reorganizing plan).
293. Id.

